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Intelligence is an indispensable component of decision-making in national security 
policy, particularly in times of war and crisis management. As the late Sherman Kent 
opined in Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, "policy leaders find 
themselves in need of a great deal of knowledge of foreign countries. They need 
knowledge which is complete, which is accurate, which is delivered on time, and which 
is capable of serving as a basis for action." Nevertheless, the burgeoning of intelligence 
literature in recent years has given very little attention to the vital role of intelligence in 
crisis management.  
Shaun P. McCarthy's The Function of Intelligence in Crisis Management is an attempt to 
repair this breach in the literature, but the author chose issues that are difficult to analyze 
and the book as a result is too narrowly focused.  
McCarthy argues correctly that intelligence often fails in warning of a crisis but pays rich 
dividends in its ability to describe and analyze key events in an ongoing crisis. The best 
examples of this phenomenon are the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the October War 
of 1973, when intelligence played an essential role in decision-making. Both events were 
classic failures of premonitory intelligence, but it would have been difficult for the 
Kennedy and Nixon administrations to deal effectively with these crises without the 
timely assessments of the intelligence community, based in part on collection from U-2 
flights and communications intercepts.  
McCarthy argues his thesis with events that were less susceptible to intelligence 
exploitation: the bombing of the US embassy and the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 
1983, the kidnapping of CIA station chief William Buckley in Beirut in 1984, and the 
hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985. Intelligence, unfortunately, is far less useful in tracking 
the violent and psychopathic actions of terrorists and nihilists in the Middle East than in 
monitoring arms control agreements and ceasefire violations. The typical terrorist 
organization is small, operationally independent, and obsessively concerned with security 
and lines of communication. McCarthy fails to acknowledge that these characteristics 
confront intelligence organizations with unique problems.  
McCarthy usefully documents the tensions between the producers of intelligence in the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the consumers of intelligence in the White House, 
the corrupt alliance between the White House and the CIA that led to the Iran-contra 
affair, and William Casey's politicization of intelligence on sensitive issues dealing with 
the Soviet Union, the Middle East and terrorism. Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, 
ultimately undermined the credibility of the agency throughout the policy community on 
issues dealing with crisis management. Secretary of State George Shultz told Gates in 
1987 that the CIA had become "an alternative State Department with its own strong 
policy views. I want to have my confidence rebuilt. I wouldn't trust anything you guys 
said about Iran no matter what." Ironically, President Ronald Reagan appointed Casey as 
director of central intelligence in 1981 in order to revive the morale of the CIA and to 
restore intelligence capabilities against terrorist organizations.  
Gates once remarked that he watched Casey "on issue after issue sit in meetings and 
present intelligence framed in terms of the policy he wanted to pursue." McCarthy 
reveals that the White House and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane wanted a 
national intelligence estimate to justify arms sales to Iran, and that Casey and his 
National Intelligence Officer for Iran, Graham Fuller, conspired to prepare such an 
estimate in 1985. Casey and Fuller disregarded the overwhelming opposition of 
intelligence analysts. McFarlane, in turn, used the estimate to overrule the objections of 
Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to such sales.  
The efforts of McFarlane at the NSC and Casey and Fuller at the CIA to improve 
relations with Iran undercut the efforts of Shultz and Weinberger to counter Iran's support 
of international terrorism. McFarlane, Casey and Fuller strongly believed that the United 
States could work with so-called moderates in Iran to arrange the release of American 
hostages held by Hizb'allah. McCarthy reveals that Casey's successor, William Webster, 
conducted an independent investigation into the CIA's directorate of intelligence and 
determined that Fuller's memorandum on Iran was inaccurate and highly politicized. The 
investigation also concluded that the Fuller initiative "had seriously undermined agency 
morale and that many senior analysts wanted to resign over the politicization of analysis 
under Casey and Gates."  
The origin of the misuse of intelligence in crisis management in the Middle East took 
place in 1981, when Casey and Secretary of State Alexander Haig demanded a national 
intelligence estimate that documented the role of the Soviet Union in the orchestration of 
international terrorism. Intelligence documents could not support these views but Casey 
and Gates eventually rolled over the directorate of intelligence and produced the estimate 
that was required to support the existing policy bias. Once managers of intelligence agree 
to support the consumer by skewing their analysis or placing a slant on specific factors, it 
is very difficult to reverse the process and adhere to a moral compass. In the case of the 
CIA, the politicization of intelligence on terrorism and the Middle East led to the 
politicization of intelligence on the Soviet Union and the failure to monitor the ultimate 
collapse of the Soviet empire.  
Unfortunately, McCarthy's solution for the problem of politicization virtually guarantees 
more politicization of intelligence in the future. He believes that intelligence analysts 
must pursue a more activist role with policy makers so that the "intelligence community 
can learn decision-makers' policy preference." The real challenge in the relationship 
between intelligence producer and consumer is to develop reasonable safeguards while 
permitting intelligence producers and consumers to interact. According to Richard Haass, 
"guarding against political pressure, guarding against parochialism is a powerful 
argument for maintaining a strong centralized [intelligence] capability, and not leaving 
decisions affecting important intelligence-related questions solely to the policy-making 
departments."  
President Harry Truman, in fact, created the CIA in order to establish distance between 
policy and intelligence and to make sure that "policy preferences" did not contaminate the 
analysis of the intelligence community. The new verification role for the CIA in the Wye 
River Memorandum could once again lead to the politicization of intelligence if 
clandestine collection serves only the parochial interests of policy makers. It is too bad 
that McCarthy's understandable exasperation over the misuse of intelligence during 
various crisis points in the Reagan administration leads him to the conclusion that 
administrative barriers between intelligence producers and consumers should be knocked 
down. Thus, while making wide use of the writings of Sherman Kent, he has not learned 
Kent's basic lesson regarding the need for some barriers to protect the substantive 
integrity of the intelligence process.  
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